Work in Progress

Monograph:

Dispositional Skepticism

What is Pyrrhonian skepticism? Sextus Empiricus, our primary ancient source for Pyrrhonism, says that it is an ability that "opposes appearances and thoughts in anyway at all, from which, because of the equal strength [isostheneia] among the opposing matters and accounts, we come first off to the suspension of judgment [epochē] and after this to tranquility [ataraxia]” (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [=PH] I 8). But I argue that there is a more fundamental feature of skepticism, which I characterize as a norm of disagreement and inquiry. I claim that skeptics develop a disposition to suspend judgment immediately in the face of a disagreement in order to inquiry into why they should assent to one side or the other. This norm helps to explain the fact that Sextus says skeptics do not believe that they have found the answers they are looking for and continue to inquire (PH I 1-3). 

Most scholars have missed this dispositional feature of Pyrrhonism because they think that one must examine the evidence before one can judge whether two sides are equally strong. In response to this, I develop an account of isostheneia on the basis of three distinct metaphors Sextus uses for this equality. Most scholars have favored the image of balanced scales, which Sextus invites with the language of suspension and arrhepsia or “equilibrium”. But others have noted that Sextus also talks about the way in which skeptical practices undermine reason, using the medicinal analogy of a diarrhetic; skeptical arguments purge themselves along with the dogmatic rashness that ails us. I point out that scholars tend to ignore the judicial language of indecision that Sextus uses to describe equal strength. This helps to clarify the skeptical norm because it is precisely the fact that skeptics find they cannot adjudicate between the parties to a disagreement that drives them to suspend judgment.

The skeptical Modes are the codification of an ability to undermine decisive reasons for one side of a disagreement or another. These Modes, and especially the five Modes of Agrippa, represent a guide for prospective skeptics who are honing their powers. The Modes of Agrippa have traditionally been interpreted as argument forms or objections that allow skeptics to block dogmatic support, but such an interpretation suffers not only from textual problems (it cannot make sense of all that Sextus says), but also philosophical issues, since it seems to make skeptics into dogmatists about logical support. In contrast to this, I argue that the Modes are dialectical moves that allow skeptics to put off decision on a particular question indefinitely, which allows the skeptic to perpetuate a situation of equal-strength understood as undecidability. Thus, the Modes are an expression of the skeptical ability used to explain the suspension of judgment.

The picture of skepticism I reveal is dispositional because Sextus encourages prospective skeptics to develop the kind of character trait familiar to many in Aristotle's Ethics. By adhering to the skeptical norm and by practicing the moves outlined in the Modes, skeptical apprentices develop a tendency to suspend judgment about any unclear matter they face. When Sextus clarifies the ethical goal of skepticism, he – rather surprisingly – claims that the skeptics do not only pursue ataraxia through the suspension of judgment, but also seek moderation of suffering [metriopatheia] in those things that are forced upon them, which suggests that “tranquility in matters of opinion” should be understood as intentional (PH I 25, 26). At the same time, Sextus will often point out that skeptics simply subscribe to what is apparent and go along with the way things seem. The analogy with Aristotelian character virtues is helpful here: Aristotle suggests that we can develop the virtues intentionally, but once those character traits take hold, they partially determine how things appear to us. The generous person finds helping others pleasant, in part because it is pleasant, but also because of her generous disposition. Similarly, Sextus might say that the skeptics find a debate undecidable because in a sense it is undecidable but also because they have developed the skeptical disposition.

In this way, my interpretation of skepticism solves the long standing debate about whether skeptics suspend judgment on the basis of a psychological, causal response or whether they suspend judgment on the basis of rational norms. Moreover, it helps us to see why this debate has arisen in the first place: The initial suspension of judgment is a kind of psychological reflex on my view, but it is not one that occurs artificially in response to the precarious balance of argumentative forces. Rather, it is a long standing habit that has developed as result of the fact that philosophical disagreements demands epochē in order to investigate and adjudicate the dispute fairly. In other words, normative considerations underlie the suspension of judgment, and the skeptical disposition sustains it.

Sextus claims that skeptics find that peace of mind follows “fortuitously” upon epochē (PH I 29), and it is difficult to argue with him on this point. If the skeptical ability is essentially a kind of character virtue, then as Aristotle says, it must involve feelings and actions. According to Sextus, the feeling is one of tranquility and the activity is inquiry into the question at hand. Pyrrhonian skepticism, then, represents a philosophical way of seeing the world that engages in inquiry to seek answers while simultaneously utilizing dialectical practices that tend to put off or undermine attempts to determine those answers definitively.

Papers:

Erudite Skeptics and Invasive Dogmatists 

The treatise Adversus Mathematicos [=M] I-VI is overlooked by many contemporary scholars. Although it is widely regarded as a single polemic against the disciplines that formed the core of the ancient education system, it is not uncommon for the parts of Against the Professors, as it is commonly called, to be treated separately, being mined as a resource about individual subjects of ancient schooling. The work is clearly meant to be taken as a whole, so we might reasonably ask why Sextus Empiricus wrote it. Indeed, it is rather curious that Sextus, as an ancient skeptic, would seek to learn so much about these particular disciplines ultimately to undermine them. Those who have focused on this question tend to suggest that the work is just like Sextus’ attack on philosophy; it is part of his standard skeptical practice of opposing arguments for and against in order to reach the suspension of judgment. But others have noted that Sextus’ practice in M I-VI seems to stray from his usual approach because, at times, he seems to accept some of these disciplines, or at least aspects of them. In fact, he hardly mentions the suspension of judgment at all. In the extreme case, some scholars have thought that the work is hopelessly befuddled and incoherent.

In this paper, I argue for a coherent reading of Adversus Mathematicos I-VI, which will shed light on the nature of Pyrrhonian skepticism in general. What other interpretations of Sextus have ignored is the intellectual curiosity and intelligence of the Pyrrhonian skeptic. It is true that Sextus emphasizes the skeptics’ ability to suspend judgment in his other works, particularly the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. But we cannot ignore the skeptics’ interest in philosophy and these other disciplines, an interest that must be explained in relation the suspensive goal, and not in opposition to it. To that end, I take seriously Sextus’ claim that the skeptics are well educated (M I 5), and explain how that conflicts with typical interpretations of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that this conflict requires that we re-evaluate Sextus’ characterization of dogmatism: Sextus is primarily concerned to defend himself against what I call an invasive dogmatist. Once we understand his target, we can more clearly see why Sextus thinks skeptical education is useful and ultimately leads to tranquility.

Precision and error in On Ancient Medicine

The central section (chapters 9-12) of the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine (VM) presents a challenge to commentators who see in its argument a shift from what precedes it in chapters 1-8. The author begins the treatise by arguing against those who suppose that medical knowledge requires suppositions or hypotheses that function as a first cause or principle of explanation (τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰτίης) (I 570 L [=Littré] = 118 J [=Jouanna]). These “newfangled hypotheses” are unnecessary, the author claims; ancient medical knowledge and practice is worthy of being called an art (τέχνη) in light of its principle (ἀρχή) and method (ὁδός) (572L=119J). The author argues for his position through the early part of the treatise (1-8), but the argument seems to shift in chapter 9 to a discussion about the degree of ἀκριβεία that can be achieved in light of the difficulty that doctors have in applying their knowledge to individual cases. For this reason, some commentators claim that chapters 9-12 represent a digression from the main argument of the treatise.

I argue for continuity between these two sections (1-8 and 9-12); the argument from 8 flows directly into 9-12. The key to understanding the argument in this middle section is the contrast found between two closely related notions of ἀκριβεία and ἀτρεκεία. In chapter 12, the author sums up his argument, saying: "And, while the art can admit of such nice exactness [ἀκριβίης], it is difficult always to attain perfect accuracy [τοῦ ἀτρεκεστάτου]" (596L=132J trans. Jones). The apparent contrast between the ἀκριβεία achieved in medicine and the extreme, ὁ ἀτρεκεστάτος, is surprising because, according to the lexicon, the terms ἀκριβεία and ἀτρεκεία are roughly synonymous. Jones' translation indicates that he thinks the contrast involves the degree of measure that is available to the doctor relative to the truth or reality that that measure attempts to match. But it is unclear, given the straightforward meanings for these terms, whether the contrast at VM 12 is one of kind, for example, the precision of one's knowledge contrasted with the accuracy of one's prescriptions; or if it is one of degree, that is, the exactness that one has now achieved contrasted with the greatest possible exactness that one might achieve. In my view, what is contrasted in the middle chapters is the doctor's particular case knowledge, which is ἀκριβήs, and his general scientific knowledge, which falls short of being ἀτρεκής. I shall argue for this by analyzing the use of these two terms (and their cognates) in the medical literature and then applying my analysis to the central chapters VM. If I am correct, there is real continuity between the early and the middle chapters of the treatise. The author is concerned to show that the traditional doctor has adequate knowledge to be skilled at medicine (1-8), and this knowledge constitutes expertise even though fully generalized principles may not be had (9-12).